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III. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Paradis was given a driver's license suspension as a result of his failure of a blood test 
on June 26, 2016, pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8002A. The notification from the Idaho 
Transportation Department was dated July 19, 2016, with an effective date of August 22, 2016 for 
the license suspension. The ALS hearing was set for August 10, 2016. This is an appeal from the 
decision of the District Court upholding the ALS hearing officer's decision to suspend Mr. Paradis' 
license. 
Party Reference: The Idaho Transportation Department is referred to as "ITD" or 
"Department" for the purposes of this argument. Mr. Paradis is referred to by name. Idaho State 
Police Forensic Services is referred to as "ISP" or "ISPFS." 
The Record: In this matter, the Idaho County District Court Clerk set out the record in a 
format as follows: The Record consist of the pleadings filed with the District Court, exhibits were 
admitted to the Supreme Court, the Agency Record and the transcripts. As a result, in this brief, 
references to the "Agency Record" will be by the page numbers noted on the "Agency Record." The 
Transcript from the ALS Hearing officer will be designated as "ALS hearing Tr." Any reference to 
the hearing in front of the District Court will be referred to as "District Court Tr.". The Clerk's 
Record will be referred to as "Record" or "District Court Record". 
Standard of Review: In Drufjell v. State Department a/Transportation, 136 Id. 853, 41 P .3d 
739 (2002), the Supreme Court set out the standard of review in matters dealing with the judicial 
reviews of administrative proceedings, the Court stated: 
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"Under the IDAPA, the ITD's decision may be overturned only where its findings: 
a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; b) exceed the agency's statutory 
authority; c) or made upon unlawful procedures; d) are not supported by substantial 
evidence in the record; ore) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. 
Section 67-5279(3). 
At p. 855. See also Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Department a/Transportation, 153 Id. 200,280 P.3d 703 
(2012). Idaho Code § l 8-8002A(7) sets out the burden of the driver to demonstrate to the Hearing 
Officer that driving privileges should be reinstated. The review of disputed issues of fact must be 
confined to the agency record for judicial review. LC. §67-5277. LC. §67-5279(1) sets out the scope 
ofreview. Bennett v. State o.f Idaho, Department of Transportation, 147 Id. 141,206 P.3d 505 (Ct. 
App. 2009). The Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the 
evidence presented. Upon judicial review of an administrative hearing officer's order a Court may 
not set aside findings unless those findings are "not supported by substantial evidence on the Record 
as a whole" I.C. §67-5279(3)(d). Mahurin v. State of Idaho, Department o.fTransportation, 140 Id. 
65, 99 P.3d 125, (2004). See also Gibbar v. State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, 143 Id. 
937, 155 P.3d 1176, (Ct. App. 2006). The appropriate remedy pursuant to the Idaho Administrative 
Procedures Act is: " ... if the agency is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part and 
remanded for further proceedings as necessary." LC. §67-5279(3). See Gibbar at p. 1181. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has held that the decision of the Transportation Department must be affirmed, 
unless the order violates statutory or constitutional provisions, exceeds the agency's authority, is 
made upon unlawful procedure, is not supported by substantial evidence, or is arbitrary, capricious 
or an abuse of discretion. Marshall v. Idaho Transportation Department, 13 7 Id. 33 7, 48 P .3d 666 
2 
(2002). The party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred in a 
manner specified in LC. §67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. 
Gibbar v. State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, 143 Id. 937, 155 P.3d 1176, (Id. App. 
2006). 
A hearing pursuant to LC. § 18-8002A results in an agency action and is therefor governed 
by the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. The constitutionality of a statute or administrative 
regulation is a question oflaw over which this court exercises free review. Wanner v. State, 151 Id. 
164, 244 P .3d 1250 (2011) at p. 1253. The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act governs the review 
of Department decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or restrict a persons driver's 
license. See LC. §§49-330, 67-5270, 49-201, 67-5201(2). Bell v. Idaho Department of 
Transportation, 151 Idaho 659, 262 P .3d. 1030 (2011 ). 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDING 
On June 26, 2016, Mark Paradis was stopped in Idaho County at approximately 12:00 a.m. 
by an Idaho County Sheriffs Deputy, Craig Hoodman. ALS Record, p. 7. Officer Hoodman was in 
a marked police vehicle. The location of the stop was the Stites Road and Holford Road. The vehicle 
driven by Mr. Paradis was a 2007 Dodge Pickup. Deputy Hoodman indicated that he followed 
behind Mr. Paradis for a long period of time. ALS Hearing Tr., p. 51, LL 10-12. He indicated he 
started following Mr. Paradis' vehicle at the Water Oz on Lamb Grade Road. ALS Hearing Tr., p. 
51, Ll 15-16. The vehicle driven by the Deputy followed Mr. Paradis' vehicle for eleven miles. ALS 
Hearing Tr., p. 64, Ll 2-7. This eleven miles took almost twenty minutes doing the speed limit. ALS 
hearing Tr., p. 64, L. 6. 
Mr. and Mrs. Paradis testified that the Deputy's driving was sporadic. Deputy Hoodman 
would come close to their vehicle, then he would back off and then come close again. ALS hearing 
Tr., p. 64, LL 11-12. The Deputy's sporadic driving also caused problems because of the glare from 
the Deputy's headlights when he was up close. ALS hearing Tr., p. 64, Ll 13-19. Both Mr. and Mrs. 
Paradis described that at the Water Oz turnoff one law enforcement vehicle went back down the 
grade that they had just come up and had a headlight out while the other vehicle followed their 
vehicle. ALS hearing Tr., p. 71, LL 3-4. Mr. Paradis described Deputy Hoodman's driving as 
follows: 
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"On the straight stretch, he would lay back a little bit. Just before he - - all the 
comers on this road are ninety degree comers, like at an intersection. So they're 
sharp. 
As soon as I would get close up to one of them and start slowing down, down-
shifting, he'd come up behind me close. So all I could see in all three ofmy mirrors 
was headlights. It made it difficult to see where the comers were. 
Q: Did you make some decision with regard to this vehicle's driving pattern? 
A: Yes. I decided I would pull off on the road and let him by. 
Q: Okay. And did you do that? 
A: I did. 
Q: 
A: 
Did you commit any bad driving during this stretch of time. 
Absolutely not." 
ALS hearing Tr., p. 71, LL 8-25 
Mrs. Paradis' described the roadway as follows: "There was gravel. Dirt and gravel." ALS 
hearing Tr., p. 65, L. 15. She described the road as not having any center lines or a fog line. ALS 
hearing Tr., p. 65, LL 16-18. She discussed the vegetation along the road: "There was nearly 3 foot 
high grass along the side of the road." ALS hearing Tr., p. 65, LL 20-21. Mrs. Paradis also 
discussed the driving pattern of her husband: 
"Q. Okay. Do you recollect any driving pattern that raised any concern for you 
with your husband? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay did you observe any invalid driving patterns from him? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you see any law violations? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you drive off onto the side of the road. 
A. No. 
Q. Ifhe had, what would have been the result? 
A. We would have gone in the ditch. 
Q. Okay. So there's no shoulder that would have allowed any- -well, let me ask 
you this: You heard the deputy's testimony? 
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A. Uh huh. 
Q. You have to answer "yes" or "no." 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you heard him testify about bad driving that he said he saw. Did that 
occur? 
A. No. 
ALS hearing Tr., p. 66, Ll 5-25 
Mr. Paradis described his drive that night: 
"Well, we went out for a drive. Like my wife said, we came down a road called Clear 
Creek and come into Kooskia. We come through Kooskia. Half-way through town 
is where the Sheriffs Department is. 
The Sheriff pulled out behind me; and he followed me for a good distance, a normal 
distance, for - -all the way to Stites, which is about 5 to 7 miles. 
I turned. I activated my turn signal and turned up to go up Lambs Grade. At that 
time, the deputy pulled into where I turned, did a U-turn, and headed back towards 
Kooskia. We proceeded on up Lambs Grade. 
ALS hearing Tr., p. 68, Ll. 4-16. 
Mr. Paradis then described Lamb Grade: 
"It's a highway, Highway 12 or 13. I don't know which one it is. 
fog line. 
Q. It has a center line and a fog line? 
A. Yes. 
Is it a two-lane road? 
A two-lane road. 
So one way each direction? 
Yes. 
Anyway, it has a 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Okay and describe for the Hearing Officer this Lambs Grade. 
Q. 
Lamb's Grade is a - - going up the grade is a narrow road. It's narrow and 
very windy all the way up. There's a lot of hairpin corners in it. It's 
something you can't mess up on because you're going to go off the road. 
So from the bottom of Lamb's Grade to the top of it, how many miles is that, 
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if you know? 
A. I would it estimate it's probably about 5 miles. 
ALS hearing Tr., p. 68, L120-25; ALS hearing Tr., p. 69, LL 1-13 
Mr. Paradis also described the road at the top of the grade. He said it was paved and dry. He 
then indicated that as of the date of the hearing, the roadway was different as they had chip-sealed 
the road. ALS hearing Tr., p. 69, LL 24-25 and p. 70, LL 1. 
The Deputy described the roadway as a country road having no center stripes or fog lines or 
anything like that. ALS hearing Tr., p. 52, LL 9-10. He also indicated that there is no real shoulder, 
just grass and the ditch and that agriculture comes right up to it, it just varies. ALS hearing Tr., p. 
52, LL 11-15. 
Mr. Paradis indicated that along the road there was really no shoulder. Some places had 
driveways for in and out of farm fields and that the grass along the road was probably a good couple 
of feet high. ALS hearing Tr., p. 70, LL 4-13. Mr. Paradis testified that he committed no bad 
driving. ALS hearing Tr., p. 71, LL 23-25. 
A question was asked if he heard what the deputy had testified. He said "yes" and denied 
committing the driving pattern as testified to by the Deputy. ALS hearing Tr., p. 72, LL 4-8. The 
following questions were put to Mr. Paradis: 
"Q. Would it have been possible for your vehicle to have made contact with 
vegetation along the side of the road? 
A. Yes. The grass was way over off the edge of the road and into the roadway, 
and I've always - - when somebody is following me, you give them as much 
room as you can and let them by to get them out from behind you. 
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Q. Okay. 
A. And that's what I was trying to do. If I (indiscernible) up, it would be way 
over the roadway. Ifl had ever left the roadway one time, I would have been 
in the ditch." 
ALS hearing Tr., p. 72, LI 12-20 
The Deputy was asked ifthere was other traffic on the roadway. He answered "no". He was 
questioned: 
"Q. You weren't concerned enough to pull the vehicle over until this other law 
enforcement officer came. Is that fair to say? 
A: No. 
Q: Okay. Well, but you didn't pull it over; and you just said that you were 
waiting until the other officer arrived. Did I get that wrong? 
A: No. You had it right. We had concerns, per the vehicle - - the vehicle similar 
to a different vehicle where we've had problems with the individual. So I 
didn't want to (indiscernible). 
Q: So there was a mistaken identity; is that right? 
A: No. I just thought that it might have been a different vehicle that we've had 
difficulties with." 
ALS hearing Tr., p. 53, LL 16-25, p. 54, LL 1-5 
The question was asked: "Okay what sort of vehicle did you confuse my client's vehicle for? 
Answer: Another white dodge." ALS hearing Tr., p. 55, LI 23-25. The deputy was asked why the 
traffic stop was actually made and he responded: "Failure to maintain his lane. The driver would drift 
off to the right of the road. His tires would go into the grass and kick up dirt because he was actually 
leaving the roadway partially." ALS hearing Tr., p. 54, LI 19-25. The deputy was then asked about 
the grass along the side of the road being high. His was: "What do you consider high?" The 
responding question was: "Well, it wasn't mowed down; right?" He answered: "No." A follow-up 
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question was made: "So it wouldn't have been a couple of inches high. It would have had to have 
been at least a foot high at the time of the incident. Right? A.: I don't believe it was a foot high, no." 
ALS hearing Tr., p. 54, LI. 23-25, ALS hearing Tr., p. 55, LI 1-6. 
At no time did the deputy video tape this twenty minutes of bad driving along this eleven 
mile stretch of road. ALS hearing Tr., p. 56, LI. 13-16. The Deputy indicated, under oath, that he 
didn't have any evidence of this failure to maintain lane other than his own testimony. ALS hearing 
Tr., p. 57, LI. 8-10. The deputy was asked at the time of the hearing whether he knew Mr. Paradis' 
blood alcohol at the time of the stop. He answered that he didn't know and that he didn't know the 
time frame from the stop to the actual blood draw. ALS hearing Tr., p. 58, LI. 15-24. 
There was differing testimony regarding when the deputy turned on his overhead lights; prior 
to the stop or after the stop. ALS hearing Tr., p. 52, LI 23-25 and p. 53 LI. 1-2. Mrs. Paradis 
indicated that her recollection was that the Trooper flipped his lights on after her husband and the 
Deputy had stopped. ALS hearing Tr., p. 55, LI. 2-6. She testified that her husband didn't pull over 
because the deputy had flipped on his lights. ALS hearing Tr., p. 55, LI 7-9. Mr. Paradis testified 
he turned off on to another road to let the law enforcement vehicle pass. ALS hearing Tr., p. 71, LI 
17-22. 
The hearing officer cited specifically from the affidavit that was filed by the deputy. Findings 
and Conclusions, ALS Record, p. 189. The Deputy's Affidavit is found at page 8 of the ALS 
Record. The hearing officer stated: 
"5. After Paradis activated the right tum signal, Deputy Hoodman stopped the 
9 
vehicle. 
6. Paradis and his wife testified the vehicle's tires did not leave the road. 
7. The testimonies of Paradis and his wife are based upon their view of the 
vehicle's tires while Paradis was driving the vehicle and his wife was sitting 
in the front passenger seat. 
8. Because Deputy Hoodman was following the vehicle, a reasonable inference 
can be made that Deputy Hoodman was clearly in a better position to 
personally observe the vehicle's tires going off the roadway. 
9. Based upon their testimonies it appears Paradis and his wife were distracted 
by the patrol vehicles headlights shining inside their vehicle and not focused 
on how Paradis was driving. 
10. The testimonies of Paradis and his wife were unsupportive, cumulative and 
did not outweigh Deputy Hoodman's testimony and Exhibit 5." 
Findings and Conclusions, ALS Record, p. 189-190 
At no place in the decision does the hearing officer define the word "unsupportive". The 
hearing officer does not describe how the testimony of Mr. Paradis and his wife were cumulative. 
The hearing officer continued: 
"12. Paradis did not submit any Idaho Code or Idaho Case Law that would have 
prevented Deputy Hoodman from following him for several miles prior to 
activating the patrol vehicles emergency lights. 
13. Despite Deputy Hoodman's initially believing the vehicle belonged to 
someone else, Paradis did not submit proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence demonstrating Deputy Hoodman had falsified a reason to enact the 
traffic stop. 
14. Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 49-630(1) Deputy Hoodman had legal cause 
to stop the vehicle driven by Paradis." 
ALS Record, p. 190 
The ALS transcript notes questions about the Deputy's job history and job duties. These 
questions were asked: 
"Q: Okay. And prior to Idaho County, who did you work for? 
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A: 
Q: 
The City of Meridian and - -
As a patrol deputy? 
A: - - the Gem County Sheriffs Department. Yes. And the Gem County 
Sheriffs Department. 
Q: What was reason for leaving that employment. 
Hearing Officer: That's not relevant, Mr. Stroschein. 
Mr. Stroschein: How do you know? 
Hearing Officer: I know because that's not part of this A.LS. process. Please 
Mr. Stroschein: 
Hearing Officer: 
Mr. Stroschein: 
Hearing Officer: 
Mr. Stroschein: 
Hearing Officer: 
Mr. Stroschein: 
Hearing Officer: 
Mr. Stroschein: 
Hearing Officer: 
continue with other questions. 
Well, just to make a record - -
The personnel history of - -
It goes to credibility. 
That's a personnel matter. You do not need to ask that 
question. And I don't care what you feel. You can appeal it. 
Go on with the next question. 
Well, I'm debating whether or not I should just make a record 
about the biased nature of you, as a Hearing Officer. 
That is not a bias, Mr. Stroschein. That is a personnel matter 
between the Deputy and his previous employer. 
So, ifhe was relieved of duty because of being untruthful, that 
wouldn't be relevant to this - - or that he doctored DUI stops? 
He probably would have just told me that he changed his 
position because of wanting to relocate or whatever. So you 
have made this a much bigger deal than it probably would 
have been. So, you've made your record as to your attitude 
with regard to this. 
And you have made your attitude, too, sir. So proceed. 
I'm not the Hearing Officer. 
I told you to proceed." (Emphasis added) 
ALS hearing Tr., p. 32, Ll 25; ALS hearing Tr., p. 33 1-25, ALS hearing Tr., p. 34, Ll 1-14 
The deputy involved, after pulling Mr. Paradis over, had Mr. Paradis complete field sobriety 
testing which according to the deputy, Mr. Paradis failed. He arrested Mr. Paradis without a warrant 
and placed Mr. Paradis in the back of his vehicle and, according to the deputy, "Advised Mark of 
the 18-8002 ALS Advisory form." ALS Record, p. 8. Mr. Paradis was transported to the Syringa 
11 
Hospital in Grangeville where a blood draw was completed by hospital staff. The completed blood 
draw kit was later processed into evidence at the Idaho County Sheriffs office. ALS Record, p. 8. 
Amanda Kendig is the individual that performed the blood draw at the hospital. Ms. Kendig was 
evasive in her answers during under oath examination. ALS hearing Tr., pp. 11-30. After the blood 
draw was completed, Ms. Kendig turned the blood vials over to the deputy. ALS hearing Tr., p. 23, 
Ll 11-13. 
As a result of the blood test, Mr. Paradis requested an administrative hearing. ALS Record, 
p. 17. A notice of telephone hearing was generated July 20, 2016, setting the hearing for August 10, 
2016. ALS Record, p. 144. A hearing was held and hearing officer issued a decision on August 22, 
2016 which was the same day the license suspension started for Mr. Paradis. ALS Record, p. 194. 
A request for stay was made to the district court on August 22, 2016. ALS Record, p. 211. 
A Petition for Judicial Review was filed on August 22, 2016, ALS Record, p. 199. A stay of the 
license suspension was entered on August 26, 2016, as noted in the file and was issued by District 
Judge Jay Gaskill. The district court set a briefing schedule. Oral argument was set for February 
6, 2017. The Court heard oral argument and issued his decision. District Court R. at p. 95. This 
appeal follows the District upholding the ITD hearing officer's decision. 
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V. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. There was no legal cause to stop the vehicle driven by Mr. Paradis. 
B. Bias of the Hearing Officer which was a violation of due process. 
13 
VI. 
ARGUMENT 
A. There was no legal cause to stop the vehicle driven by Mr. Paradis. 
The District Court in its decision compared Mr. Paradis' driving to the driving found in State 
v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205,209,953 P.2d 645,649, (Idaho Ct. App. 1998). State v. Flowers quoted 
State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286, (Idaho Ct. App. 1996). Mr. Paradis 
described his driving pattern over 11 miles and approximately 20 minutes. The Deputy pulled him 
over was because Mr. Paradis started a turn onto another road. The turn was made because Mr. 
Paradis got tired of the Deputy's bad driving pattern of pulling up and backing off and pulling up and 
backing off over the course of 11 miles and 20 minutes. There was no other bad driving described. 
In Flowers, there is no law enforcement officer bad driving that was involved in the driving pattern 
of Mr. Flowers. In Flowers the Court of Appeals notes: 
In its memorandum decision denying Flowers' motion to suppress, the magistrate 
stated that Flowers' "vehicle then moved to the left and crossed onto the center line, 
touching the center line with the left front tires of his vehicle, which occurred again 
moments later." The magistrate later concluded: 
[Flowers'] slow speed, hugging of the fog line, weaving in his lane of travel, crossing 
the fog line to the width of a tire, and then moving left to touch the center line one 
or two times, all within a mile or two, give rise to reasonable suspicion. 
Pg. 647. 
The court then went on to note the Atkinson case by reviewing the facts: 
On May 7, 1993, at approximately 11:45 p.m., Captain Brian McNary ... was 
driving northbound on Main Street in Hailey, Idaho, and observed a vehicle traveling 
ahead of him. The vehicle, which was driven by Atkinson, moved to the left so that 
its left tires crossed onto or over the center line. When the vehicle had continued 
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down Main Street for approximately two blocks, McNary saw it again veer to the left 
so that the tires touched but did not entirely cross the center line. The vehicle then 
swerved to the right across the traffic lane and touched the fog line with its right-side 
tires. 
Pg. 649. 
These facts in Mr. Paradis' case are undisputed; (1) Mr. Paradis was followed for 11 miles or 
approximately 20 minutes on a stretch of highway, (2) where there was no traffic and it was paved 
road with no marked lanes or lines, (3) the vegetation was growing up over the side of the road, ( 4) 
the Deputy would drive up onto Mr. Paradis and then back off and then drive up onto Mr. Paradis 
and then back off and then drive up onto Mr. Paradis and then back off, (5) the Deputy thought Mr. 
Paradis' vehicle was actually some other vehicle that law enforcement had been looking for, and ( 6) 
Mr. Paradis decided to avoid this Deputy's bad driving and decided to tum off. Mr. Paradis made 
a proper signal to tum and it is at that point that the Deputy decided to stop him. The District Court 
found that Mr. Paradis moving over to let the Deputy pass was a weaving pattern and was not within 
the range of normal driving behavior. He commented on the Deputy by stating" ... and there is 
simply no evidence in the record that Deputy Hoodman is not a credible witness." District Court 
Record atp. 99. (emphasis added) However, there is also nothing on this record to show that Mr. and 
Mrs. Paradis are not credible witnesses. In this case, the hearing officer would not allow an inquiry 
into the Deputy's training or background and other issues involving his job as a law enforcement 
officer. Mr. Paradis was prevented from developing questions about credibility. Mr. Paradis' case 
is not like Flowers or Atkinson. Those cases do not have a deputy that did not bring any part of his 
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record to the due process hearing because someone drove off with it. ALS Tr. at p. 35, LL 9-10. The 
Court can also note the Deputy's lack of memory regarding the stop. ALS Tr. at pp. 35-59 generally. 
There was no legal cause for stop pursuant to LC. § 18-8002A. State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 
362 P.3d 514 (2015) interpreted several sections of Idaho Code including LC. §49-630(1), §49-
630(2), §49-644(1), §49-625 and §49-637. The Court in Neal indicated as follows: 
"Idaho Code section 49-630(1) requires that drivers drive on the right half of the 
roadway. State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293,298, 32 P.3d 685,690 (Ct.App. 2001). Put 
another way, section 49-630(1) does not prohibit driving anywhere on the right half 
of the roadway except sidewalks, shoulders, berms, and rights-of-way. There is no 
mention of the edge, the edge line, the fog line, or any other kind of marker. 
Construing this section together with 49-63 7 ( 1 ), so that they are not in conflict, leads 
to the conclusion that section 49-637(1) does not prohibit driving on an edge line in 
the roadway. There was no allegation here that Neal was driving on the shoulder; 
therefore, he was still in the roadway. 
In fact, the edge line may or may not even be present on the roadway; its purpose is 
not to create a lane boundary but to inform the driver of the road's edge so that under 
certain conditions the driver can safely maintain his or her position on the roadway. 2 
Because the edge lines are not always present, if they are not part of the lane, then the 
usable portion of the lane would actually be widening or narrowing depending on 
whether there is a line present. Where the lines are absent, the edge of the road is 
considered the curb, and it is an unreasonable interpretation to conclude that where 
there is a stripe near the edge, the inside of the stripe marks the limits of where a 
driver's tires can go, but where it is absent, the curb--which would be located at the 
outer edge of the painted line--marks those limits. 
Further, the motor vehicle code in general often encourages or requires drivers to 
move to the right. Therefore, driving onto the right edge marker would not seem to 
be a safety concern. For instance, when driving at less than normal speed of traffic, 
one must drive" as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the highway . 
. . . " I. C. § 49-630(2). When turning, " [b ]oth the approach for a right turn and the 
right tum shall be made as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the 
roadway." LC.§ 49-644(1). A driver must immediately drive" as close as possible 
to the nearest edge or curb of the highway" upon the approach of police vehicles 
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using audible or visible signals. LC. § 49-625. Movement toward the right edge of 
the highway, roadway, or main traveled way is not prohibited in the motor vehicle 
code except where the driver must yield to someone else who has the right of way . 
. . . Thus there does not appear to be any support for interpreting " as nearly as 
practicable within a single lane" to exclude the edge of the roadway; in fact where the 
edge of the roadway is mentioned in the code, its use is encouraged." (Emphasis 
added) 
Neal, Id. 
In this case, both Mr. and Mrs. Paradis testified that the deputy in question would drive up 
on their vehicle and then back off over this twenty (20) minute period of time from the Water Oz 
turnoff to the point where Mr. Paradis signaled to turn. He was then stopped. Mr. Paradis testified 
that he moved his vehicle to the right to allow the deputy to pass. Of course, the deputy never did 
pass. He would just back off. The testimony is, from all three witnesses, that the vegetative growth 
along the side of the road was uncut. Each Paradis testified that the growth was up to a foot high and 
spilled over onto the roadway. The deputy testified that the growth was overgrown but he didn't give 
a specific height. Each Paradis testified that the lights from the deputy's vehicle shone extremely 
brightly in their rearview miITors. 
In this case, all parties testified that the roadway was unlined, meaning there was no center 
line and there was no fog line. There was no broken white lines down the center of the road. It was 
simply an unmarked road. The testimony also was that there wasn't any shoulder during this stretch 
of roadway, other than perhaps drive-ins for either fields or residences along the way. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court indicated in Neal: "Further, the motor vehicle code in general often 
encourages or requires drivers to move to the right." Neal, at p. 446. The evidence in Paradis is that 
any driving to the right edge of the roadway was caused by the deputy's erratic driving pattern. 
There is nothing on the Paradis record that refutes the deputy's erratic driving pattern. 
The hearing officer cited to LC. §49-630(1) by stating: "1. Idaho Code Section 49-630(1) 
provides: 'Upon all highways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the 
roadway'. 4. The vehicle's passenger tires would touch the grass on the edge of the road causing 
dust to fly up off the side of the road and then the vehicle would swerve back into the road." ALS 
Record, p. 189. The hearing officer continued: "Based upon their testimonies, it appears Paradis and 
his wife were distracted by the patrol vehicle's headlights shining inside their vehicle and not 
focused on how Paradis was driving." ALS Record, p. 190. On this record, the hearing officer did 
not deny that the deputy was driving in an erratic manner. The hearing officer also believed the 
testimony from Mr. and Mrs. Paradis regarding the fact that Deputy Hoodman followed Mr. Paradis 
for several miles, prior to activating the patrol vehicle's emergency lights. ALS Record, p. 190. 
A statement of the hearing officer from the Findings and Conclusions, noted as subparagraph 
4, is taken directly from the probable cause affidavit which is Exhibit No. 5 of this record. ALS 
Record, p. 8. The hearing officer also made a Finding that the Deputy believed the vehicle belonged 
to someone else when he began following it. ALS Record, p. 190, See subparagraph 13 .1 The 
1 
"13. Despite Deputy Hoodman initially believing the vehicle belonged to someone else, ... " 
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hearing officer determined that pursuant to I. C. §49-630( 1 ), Deputy Hoodman had legal cause to stop 
the vehicle. I.C. §49-630(1) states as follows: 
DRIVE ON RIGHT SIDE OF ROADWAY --EXCEPTIONS. (1) Upon all highways 
of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway except 
as follows: 
(a) When overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction 
under the rules governing such movement; 
(b) When an obstruction exists making it necessary to drive to the left of the center 
of the highway. Any person doing so shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles 
traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portion of the highway within 
a distance as to constitute an immediate hazard; 
(c) Upon a highway divided into three (3) marked lanes for traffic under the 
applicable rules; or 
( d) Upon a highway restricted to one-way traffic. 
Both, Mr. and Mrs. Paradis were very clear that Mr. Paradis did not leave the roadway and 
that any observations by the deputy behind them would have been caused by the overgrowth along 
the side of the road. Mr. Paradis drove on the right side of the roadway. 
There are also other factors the Court must take into account. The distance the deputy 
decided to follow Mr. Paradis, which was 11 miles. Mr. Paradis was followed by another law 
enforcement vehicle for a very lengthy period of time before he turned up Lambs Grade. ALS 
hearing Tr., p. 68, LL. 4-16. The Court can take into account the description of Lambs Grade 
provided by Mr. Paradis which was not contradicted on this record. Mr. and Mrs. Paradis passed 
two law enforcement vehicles which were parked at the Water Oz turnoff. One headed down the 
hill and one ended up following Mr. Paradis. Most likely the Deputy followed Mr. Paradis because 
he thought Mr. Paradis was this other individual "we've had problems with". ALS hearing Tr., p. 
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53, L. 25. Mr. and Mrs. Paradis also testified about the other law enforcement vehicle having ahead 
light out. There is no indication that the deputy contacted dispatch to run the license plate for this 
white dodge pickup that he followed for eleven (11) miles and approximately twenty minutes. ALS 
hearing Tr., p. 56, Ll 1-5. There is no explanation given for the lapse. 
The hearing officer indicated that counsel could not point to any case law or statute requiring 
a law enforcement officer to pull Mr. Paradis over. There is a case in which the court describes a 
"relatively long period" of time as 3 minutes or 3 miles. In State v. Cunningham, 2011 Westlaw 
1104 72 71, a Court of Appeals case from 2011 which is an unpublished decision and has no 
precedent or binding authority on the court and is only cited for the benefit of an appellate court's 
thought on what a long period of time might be. The Court of Appeals noted: 
Morever, Cunningham was observed driving in this matter late at night and 
consistently over a relatively long period of 3 minutes or 3 miles. This unusual 
driving pattern over a long period of time supported a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion of inattentive or impairment. (Emphasis added) 
Atpg. __ _ 
This quote is found right above the conclusion of the case. In the Flowers case cited by the 
District Court, the bad driving occurred all within a mile or two. In Adkinson, the bad driving 
occurred within two blocks, not eleven miles. 
There is no other bad driving pattern noted in this record over the 11 miles. Mr. Paradis was 
not going too fast or too slow. There is no testimony about weaving in his lane; going to into the 
opposite lane, drifting; straddling the middle of the road or swerving or almost striking an object or 
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vehicle or any sort of problem with turning with a wide radius. There is no stopping problems noted. 
No unnecessary acceleration or deceleration. No varying of speed. No ten miles per hour or more 
under the speed limit. There is no indication of driving without headlights or failing to signal or any 
sort of failure to respond to the officer's signal. There is no stopping in the lane for no apparent 
reason. There was no following too closely. No improper or unsafe lane changes. No illegal or 
improper tum. There is no indication of inappropriate or unusual behavior or any indication of 
appearing to be impaired, meaning observations of the deputy of Mr. Paradis or his wife sitting in 
their vehicle while it was moving. These indicators are taken from the National Highway Traffic 
Administration's manual regarding field sobriety testing and the reasons listed as indicators of 
impairment. ALS hearing Tr., p. 10, Ll 11-17. (Notice taken by the hearing officer). 
On this record, based on the hearing officer's own determination that the driving pattern of 
Mr. Paradis was caused by the driving pattern of the deputy, there can be no cause for a legal stop. 
The Court has to consider the improper interpretation by the hearing officer of the testimony 
from Mr. and Mrs. Paradis. The hearing officer stated: 
"The testimonies of Paradis and his wife were unsupportive, cumulative and did not 
outweigh Deputy Hoodman's testimony and Exhibit 5." 
Records, p. 190 
What does the word "unsupportive" mean in reference to this case? The hearing officer 
doesn't explain how the testimony of Mr. or Mrs. Paradis was "cumulative". 
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Nowhere on this record does it show Deputy Hoodman's training regarding his ability to 
perform field sobriety tests or judge whether a person is impaired. Counsel for Mr. Paradis 
submitted, as Exhibit J, the Initial Inmate Assessment. This document sets out a jail staffs 
observations and comments at the jail. ALS Record, p. 70. The staff member at the jail noted that 
there was no stagger in Mr. Paradis' walk, no slurred talking, no odor of an alcohol beverage, no red 
or blood shot eyes and no evidence of needle marks. In fact, there is nothing in any of Exhibit J that 
would show that Mr. Paradis was intoxicated. The hearing officer states: 
"The record lacks proof that the person who completed Exhibit J was trained to 
detect and determine whether a driver of a motor vehicle was impaired. 6. Hence, 
Exhibit J, was not relevant in this ALS hearing." 
ALS Record, p. 191 
This comment shows bias by the hearing officer as there is nothing in this record that shows 
that Deputy Hoodman was trained to do the field sobriety tests or specifically trained to determine 
when someone was impaired to drive a motor vehicle. The only thing the hearing officer had was 
that Deputy Hoodman was a deputy. Most likely Hearing Officer Moody knew of Deputy Hoodman 
while he worked in southern Idaho. 
Both the hearing officer and the District Court failed to take into account the following in 
their determination of credibility. Deputy Hoodman, in his declaration, checked a box that stated: 
"Defendant was tested for alcohol concentrations, drugs or other intoxicating substances. The test( s) 
was/were performed in compliance with Sections 18-8003 and 18-8004(4), Idaho Code and the 
standards and method adopted by the Department of Law Enforcement." ALS Record, p. 9. This 
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document was signed under oath on June 26, 2016. There is nothing on the record that shows the 
deputy had any training with regard to blood draws or any training with regard to blood testing. In 
fact, he confirmed these points during his under oath testimony. The Forensic Volatile Analysis 
Report was not completed until July 18, 2016. ALS Record, p. 11. There is no way that this deputy 
could have, under oath, verify what he states in his probable cause affidavit. The affidavit also cites 
to rules of the "Department of Law Enforcement" which has not existed for years. 
The hearing officer found that a "reasonable inference" could be made that Deputy Hoodman 
was "clearly in a better position to personally observe the vehicle's tires going off of the road." ALS 
Record, p. 189. Mr. and Mrs. Paradis were riding in the vehicle. A reasonable inference could be 
drawn that they would have felt and seen if the vehicle had left the pavement. Both Mr. and Mrs. 
Paradis were well aware of the grass being over the side of the road, as was the deputy. Mr. Paradis 
noted that he tried to move over to the right so that this erratic law enforcement driver behind him 
could pass. The testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Paradis meets the burden set out in I. C. § 18-8002A as 
it contradicts the deputy's testimony and his affidavit. The affidavit has to be called into question 
because the deputy verifies things that he clearly doesn't know anything about. 
The Findings by the hearing officer are not supported by the substantial evidence on the 
record as a whole. I.C. §67-5279(3)(d). In this particular case, the hearing officer violated the 
provisions ofl.C. §67-5279(3) and its subparts. The hearing officer only interpreted the facts in such 
a way as to uphold the license suspension and not for the sake of due process. The hearing officer 
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failed the requirements ofl.C. §18-8002A(l)(t)2. The hearing officer interfered with Counsel's 
questioning of the witnesses and failed to respond to Counsel's request to ask the witness to be 
responsive to the questions that were being put forward. 
The decision of the hearing officer violated the provision of I.C. § l 8-8002A(7)(a) and I.C. 
§67-5279(3)(a-e). The Paradis record provides enough evidence to show by a preponderance that 
there was not a legal cause for the stop. 
The Court can review In re Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 155 P.3d 176 (Ct. App. 2006): 
"An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her possession, 
and those inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience and law 
enforcement training. State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319,321, 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 
(Ct.App.1988). Suspicion will not be found to be justified if the conduct observed by 
the officer fell within the broad range of what can be described as normal driving 
behavior. Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286." (emphasis added) 
Mr. and Mrs. Paradis described a normal driving behavior on the part of Mr. Paradis based 
on the inappropriate driving pattern of the deputy. Mr. Paradis bears the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the deputy lacked legal cause to stop his vehicle. A 
"preponderance of the evidence" means that the evidence shows something to be more probably true 
than not. Oxley v. Medicine Rock Specialties, Inc., 139 Idaho 476, 80 P.3d 1077 (2013). Therefore, 
Mr. Paradis had to show to that it was more probably true than not that he did not violate I.C. §49-
630(1 ). The record is un-refuted that Mr. Paradis was followed for a period of time by another 
deputy before he drove up Lamb's Grade. He was then followed by Deputy Hoodman for "several" 
2(t) "Hearing officer" means a person designated by the department to conduct administrative hearings. The hearing 
officer shall have authority to administer oaths, examine witnesses and take testimony, receive relevant evidence, issue 
subpoenas, regulate the course and conduct of the hearing and make a final ruling on the issues before him. 
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miles. During that "several" miles it is un-refuted that Deputy Hoodman would drive up upon the 
Paradis vehicle with his headlights brightly shining into the Paradis vehicle and then back off. Mr. 
Paradis, knowing law enforcement was behind him, moved over to the right hand side of the road 
so that the Deputy's vehicle, which was constantly moving up on Mr. Paradis' back end and then 
backing off, could pass. The Deputy never did pass even though he was following Mr. Paradis for 
"several" miles, thinking that Mr. Paradis was someone else. ALS hearing Tr., p. 53, LL 23-25. Mr. 
Paradis chose to tum-off onto another roadway to avoid the bad driving of Deputy Hoodman. Mr. 
Paradis has shown, more probably true than not, that he did not violate the code section used by the 
hearing officer which simply instructs that a vehicle be driven on the right half of the roadway. Mr. 
Paradis drove on the right half of the roadway. Hitting overgrown weeds on the road is not a law 
violation. 
Counsel tried to get into to the officer's "experience and law enforcement training" but the 
Hearing Officer inappropriately interfered with Counsel's inability to examine the deputy. ALS 
hearing Tr., pp. 33-34. The deputy was called as witness by Mr. Paradis. In this case, the Court has 
to disregard any "reasonable inferences" from the deputy because of the interference of the hearing 
officer. There is no evidence on this record regarding the deputy's "experience and law enforcement 
training," as required by Gibbar, supra. The Court knows that the driving of Mr. Paradis is not 
unusual driving for the roadway in question. In fact, trying to avoid a bad driver like the deputy is 
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normal. The hearing officer specifically accepted bad driving on the part of the deputy3• ALS 
Record, p. 190. Remember, the hearing officer found that this deputy followed Mr. Paradis for 
several miles before the stop. ALS Record, p. 1904 Law enforcement do not follow drunk drivers 
for "several" miles; they pull them over. 
The hearing officer indicated that the deputy stopped the vehicle for "failing to maintain its 
lane of travel". R., p. 1895• However, this is a violation ofl.C. §49-637(1). There were no marked 
lanes, so LC. §49-637(1) cannot apply to this case. The District Court did not note or apply State 
v. Neal,159 Idaho 439,362 P.3d 514 (2015). 
Let's take this bad driving by the deputy one step further and say that the deputy had actually 
hit the back of the Paradis' vehicle causing it to go off the roadway. As a result, the deputy decided 
to "stop" the Paradis' vehicle. The deputy does not get to cause the reason for the pullover to the 
benefit of the State in these ALS proceedings. The hearing officer cited to LC. §49-630(1): "Upon 
all highways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the roadway ... " ALS 
Record, p. 189. Mr. Paradis drove on the right half of the roadway. 
Mr. Paradis does not ask the Court to second guess the hearing officer. What the Court is 
asked to do, is be the unbiased decision maker that the hearing officer was not. 
3 
"1. Based upon their testimonies, it appears Paradis and his wife were distracted by the patrol vehicle's headlights 
~hining inside their vehicle ... " 
12. Paradis did not submit any Idaho code or Idaho case law that would have prevented Deputy Hoodman from ff 11owing him for several miles prior to activating the patrial vehicle's emergency lights. 
2. Deputy Hood man stopped the vehicle driven by Paradis for failing to maintain its lane of travel. 
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VII. 
BIAS OF HEARING OFFICER IS A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS 
Prejudice is shown by the hearing officer in how he managed this ALS Hearing and it should 
be a focus of the Court. 
In State v. Finch, 79 ID. 275, 315 P.2d 529 (1957), the Court noted: 
It should always be kept in mind that the evil of administrative action which must be 
guarded against is not the fact finding power, but the conclusiveness of the fact 
finding power coupled with the order based on the findings made which would 
deprive a person of a property right. Such is the full exercise of judicial power, and 
such power in this state can be exercised only by one of the enumerated courts. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Id., as cited in Electors of Big Butte Area v. State Board of Education, 78 Idaho 602, 308 P .2d 225 
(1957), Id at p. 281. The Comi also cites the United States Supreme Court, St. Joseph Stockyards 
Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 56 S.Ct. 720, 80 L.Ed. 1033 (1936): 
Legislative agencies, with varying qualifications, work in a field particularly exposed 
to political demands. Some may be expert and impartial, others subservient. It is not 
difficult for them to observe the requirements of law in giving a hearing and 
receiving evidence. But to say that their findings of fact may be made conclusive 
where constitutional rights of liberty and property are involved, although the 
evidence clearly establishes that the findings are wrong and constitutional rights have 
been invaded, is to place those rights at the mercy of administrative officials and 
seriously to impair the security inherent in our judicial safeguards. That prospect, 
with our multiplication of administrative agencies, is not one to be lightly regarded. 
It is said that we can retain judicial authority to examine the weight of evidence when 
the question concerns the right of personal liberty. (Emphasis added) 
Id. at p. 282. 
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See also Article 5, Sections 2, 13, and 20 and Article 1, Section 18 of the Idaho Constitution. 
The process used by ITD in Mr. Paradis' case is the sort of"evil" the Supreme Court warned 
against. There is no information in Flowers or Atkinson that the judges involved would not let the 
lawyer do his job with regard to examination of the witnesses. The ALS hearing officer interfered. 
These ALS matters are suppose to be conducted so that the driver has a fair hearing. Based on this 
record Mr. Paradis did not get a fair hearing from a biased hearing officer who interfered with a 
normal inquiry. The District Court in Mr. Paradis' case commented on the hearing officer's actions 
in his decision by stating "Although this court does not condone the way the hearing officer shut 
down the line of inquiry, this court must make its decision based on the record ... ". District Court 
Tr. P. 99. The hearing officer interfered with the making of the record. 
The court noted during the hearing: 
Mr. Stroschein was there, and I guess we can listen to the recording. The kind of 
flippant response by the hearing officer might give Mr. Stroschein cause to think that 
he is bias because of what I would view as non-judicial type of reply, but we may 
view that as a total cutoff. You better not go there any further. He shut off at that 
point in time on that issue, and you are saying he should have approached it again 
and made a record okay, I will allow you the rest of your argument. (Emphasis added) 
District Court Tr. at p. 21, line 17-25. 
In this case, no discovery was allowed. No subpoena duces tecum was allowed. No in person 
hearing was allowed. See Gibbar, supra, regarding in-person hearings when dealing with the 
credibility of witnesses. The Court can look at the bias of the hearing officer in how he conducted 
this ALS hearing. First, the Court can look at the exchange regarding the testimony of the deputy's 
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work history. ALS hearing Tr., pp. 32-34. Counsel for Mr. Paradis simply asked a question about 
why the Deputy left his prior employment and then the hearing officer interfered. Counsel filed an 
Objection regarding the way the hearing officers usually conduct their hearings. ALS Record, p. 4 7. 
The objection read in part: 
As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 
1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172, (1977) the interest in a driver's license is a substantial one. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has found that procedural due process serves to ensure that 
the person threatened with loss has an opportunity to present his side of the story to 
a "neutral decision maker" at a time when the deprivation can be prevented. Fuentes 
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556, (1972). 
ALS Record, pp. 4 7-48 
As the court is aware an impartial decision maker is an essential element of due process. See 
Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 787, 86 P.3d 494,501 (2004) overruled on other grounds 
by City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 277 P.3d 353 (2012). In State Transportation 
Department v. Kalani-Keegan, 155 Idaho 297 (Ct. of Appeals 2013), 311 P.3d 309, the court noted: 
p. 300. 
It is well established that the party challenging an agency decision must demonstrate 
the agency erred in the manner specified in LC. § 67-5279(3) and that a substantial 
right of that party had been prejudiced. 
The court noted: 
p. 301. 
As such, the ITD has, as a matter of law, substantial rights and the fairness of the 
decision making process and the outcome of the proceeding - namely, proper 
adjudication through application of correct legal standards which, upon violation, are 
prejudice. 
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The court having cited the Eacret case regarding the commissioner's likely bias noted: 
p. 301 
This includes the right for all interested parties to have a meaningful opportunity to 
present evidence to the governing board on the salient factual issues. Cites omitted. 
These cases align with the overarching due process principal that everyone with a 
statutory interest in the outcome of a decision is entitled to meaningful notice and a 
fair hearing before an impartial decision maker. 
The court then went on to note: 
p.303 
In this context, these are the directly interested parties who, according to Hawkins, 
have as a procedural matter, a substantial right to a reasonably fair decision making 
process and of course in the outcome of the proceedings by application of correct 
legal standard. 
In this case, the hearing officer interfered with the ability to examine the Deputy. He provided 
no assistance in the examination of phlebotomist from the hospital. The hearing officer noted in a 
conclusionary fashion that the testimony of Paradis and his wife were unsupportive, cumulative and 
did not outweigh Deputy Hoodman's testimony in Exhibit 5 which is the affidavit filed by the 
Deputy. The hearing officer does not explain why this statement is true based upon the record. 
The Court can use the Bell v. !TD, 151 Idaho 659,262 P.3d 1030 (2011) and Gibbar v. State 
of Idaho, Department of Transportation, 143 Id. 937, 155 P.3d 1176 (Ct. App. 2006) decisions in 
its analysis of due process in these ALS hearing. ALS hearing officers cannot make decisions 
regarding constitutional challenges to Idaho Statutes. See IDAPA Rule 04.11.01.415. 
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It is well established that the suspension of an issued motor vehicle operator's license 
involves State action that adjudicates important property interest of the license. In such cases, the 
licenses or driving privileges are not to be taken without the procedural due process rights required 
by the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 
52 L.Ed.2d, 152 (1977); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,931 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d, 90 (1971) and 
Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112, 103 S.Ct. 3513, 77 L.Ed.2d, 12, 66 (1983). The Idaho 
Constitution provides additional due process protection. 
The Court is aware the administrative license scheme deprives Mr. Paradis of his driver's 
privileges which is a valuable right recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court. See State v. Ankney, 
109 Id. 1, 704 P.2d 333 (1985) and State v. Kouni, 58 Id. 493, 76 P.2d 917 (1938). 
The Court should focus on Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 
(1976) in determining whether an administrative proceeding satisfies due process. Matthews sets 
out three factors to determine the due process rights in administrative proceedings. The first factor 
deals with the private interest that would be effected by the official action. The second involved the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the probable value, 
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. The final factor involves the government's 
interest including the function involved in the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional 
or substitute procedure would entail. See Bell, supra. 
The Court In the Matter of Wilson, 128 Idaho 161, 167; 911 P.2d 754 (1996) stated, 
"Procedural due process requires that a party be provided at an opportunity to be heard at a 
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meaningful time and in a meaningful manner". See also Cootz v. State, 117 Idaho 38, 785 P .2d 163 
(1989). 
In Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532,207 P. 724 (1922) the Supreme Court stated: 
"Due process oflaw is not necessarily satisfied by any process which the legislature 
may by law provide, but by such process only as safeguards and protects the 
fundamental, constitutional rights of the citizen." 
Substantial due process requires that state action which deprives a person of life, liberty or 
property have some rational basis, that is, the reason for the deprivation may not be so inadequate 
that the judiciary will characterize is as arbitrary. Pace v. Hymas, 111 Idaho 581, 726 P.2d 693 
(1986). 
The standard applicable in due process cases is whether the challenged law bears a rational 
relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. In State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181,911 P.2d 742 (Ct. 
App. 1995), the Court set out the Matthews test for determining whether State action violates due 
process. The Matthews v. Eldridge case is cited in many decisions in the State ofldaho. See also 
Lu RanchingCompanyv. US, 67 P.3d 85 (2003) andBradburyv. Idaho Judicial Counsel, 136 Idaho 
63, 28 P.3d 10, 06 (2001). In Bradbwy, the Court stated: 
"To determine whether an individual's due process rights under the 14th Amendment 
had been violated, courts must engage in a two step process. The court must first 
decide whether the individual's threatened interest is a liberty or property interest 
under the 14th Amendment. ( cites omitted) Only after the court finds a liberty or 
property interest will it reach the next step of analysis in which it determines what 
process is due ( cites omitted)". 
In Bell, supra, there were several continuations. The Court stated: 
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"Because no such objection was made, the hearing officer had no occasion to present 
any justification for the delay or explanation of how it may have served a 
governmental interest. 
Although Bell's repeated requests for irrelevant discovery contributed somewhat to 
the hearing postponements, the delays involved here are troubling to this Court. The 
actions of the hearing officer evidence little regard for Bell's substantial interests in 
receiving a decision before, or at least promptly after, the deprivation of his license." 
( emphasis added) 
Atp. __ 
In State v. Decker, 152 Idaho 142,267 P.3d 729 (Ct. App. 2011), the Court of Appeals stated: 
"It is fundamental to our legal system that the state shall not deprive 'any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw.' U.S. Constitution, Amendment 
Fourteenth, Section One. It is a two step process to determine due process rights: 
first, deciding whether a government decision would deprive an individual of a 
liberty or property interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's due 
process clause; and second, if a liberty or property interest is implicated, a balancing 
test must be applied to determine what process is due. State v. Rogers, 144 Id. 738, 
740, 170 P.3d 881, 883 (2007)." 
Atp. __ _ 
Even though the standard that is used in these ALS decisions does not allow the Court to 
substitute its judgment for that of the hearing officer, the Court can find that Mr. Moody was a biased 
hearing officer and that this hearing was not conducted pursuant to the standards set out by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. See Dixon v. Love, Supra and Fuentes v. Shevin, Supra. 
The hearing officer failed to reign in the witness, Mandi Kendig, when counsel tried to get 
assistance from the hearing officer. Ms. Kendig was not willing to answer questions. It was like 
pulling teeth to get a "yes" or "no" response to a "yes/no" question. 
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Another ALS hearing officer made the following statement about ALS Hearing Officers 
Baumann and Moody in an ALS decision reviewed by Judge FitzMaurice: 
Exhibits G - J were admitted into the record and throughly reviewed by the Hearing 
Officer assigned to this matter. Evidence pertaining to other hearing officers (Moody 
and Baumann) shall be given little weight because each ALS Hearing Officer is given 
autonomy to render completely independent impartial decisions regardless of the 
decisions or practices of other assigned Hearing Officers. 
Mizer Record, pp. 258- 259. (Judicial Review Idaho County Case No. CV16-44666). 
The District Court was well aware of the Mizer case because it sat on the ALS Judicial 
review for Mr. Mizer. In the Mizer case, the District Court was made aware of several emails 
regarding ALS hearing officers. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court are also well aware of 
different email exchanges regarding the ALS hearing officers and Idaho State Patrol Forensic 
Services. See State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134, 306 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 2013). Mr. Moody, the 
hearing officer in Mr. Paradis' case was a hearing officer that sent emails to ISP. These emails were 
a part of the record in State v. Besaw and Besaw v. !TD and were referenced in the briefing in both 
Besaw cases. Mr. Moody, in an email to Matthew Gammett of the ISP Forensic Services, noted on 
Thursday, September 2, 2010, at 1 :08 p.m.: 
"Mr. Gammett, I am one of the three ITD ALS hearing officers. During oral 
argument, two attorneys have already argued the two minute separation between two 
breath test results (SOP 6.2) did not occur with the intoxilyzer 5000 EN. Through my 
BTS training, my understanding is that the intoxilyzer 500 EN is programmed to 
inform the operator when to have the driver blow. Therefore, is SOP 6.2 for the 
alcosensor III and the lifelock FC20 and not the intoxilyzer 5000 EN? 
Also I reviewed the intoxilyzer 5000 manual. On page 27 number 12 you have SOP 
III as a reference. I believe that this SOP is from an old reference section number. 
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As a hearing officer, I really respect the time your agency has taken to update this 
manual and the SOPs. I hope these updates reinforce our ALS decisions." Emphasis 
added. 
State v. Besaw, supra, Clerk's Record at p. 203. 
A copy of this email is attached for the Court's ease ofreference as Exhibit A. Based upon 
the record before the Court, there is ample opportunity to find a violation of due process as a result 
of a biased hearing officer. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
The court must overturn the hearing officer's decision and remand the matter back to ITD with 
an order to vacate the license suspension. 
DATED this Oday of July, 2017. 
By __,_~,__""'r-
Charles M. Stro ein, a member of the firm 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the-l-1 day of July, 2017, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document in compliance with all of the requirements set out in I.A.R. 
34.1 , and that an electronic copy was served on each party and addressed to the following: 
Edwin L. Litteneker 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 321 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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From!,, 
Sen.6 
· To: 
cc: 
subJecfr 
G .. ame.tf.$. Mat~rievJ 
. Tnut.s9.ay;.·$.eptember.02, 2D:t0tt:-'l2',P.M·::-::···::. ';· 
·Erl9 M9opy 
Jg\lp$.lt:?n, Jeremy 
Quesffbns apbut th~ manuals 
Thank yo_u for your cc:nnments, l am forwarqtng them to Jeremy Johnston for r¢view. Jeterny c;:1h email out clarification 
on these items, lriliete anr;;i:ny thi;lnges needed, we will put them rn during our next rev.isl9n, ThahK yqu agaln for 
takirlgtfie time to commun.kate with us. If there i~ any way we can help, you, do not hesit'.lte to ask; 
Ma:tthr;w. GJ~nwtt:e: 
Idaho State Pqlice Forensic Services 
Qli.;1llfy Matiag~t 
Ffom;. ~ric ~ppd'f trna,i1to:1::n~,rvio9cty@itf!:idaoo.gtJVJ 
!?~nt; Thurs9a'{.i: September 02, 2010 1:08 PM 
To: Gametter MattheW 
~ubJec;f:: .RE: Idaho Breath Alcohol S0f' Upd9ted 
I am one of tlie three ITD ALS hearing officers. During oral arguments, two attorrreys 
have already argued the two minute separati.91i 15~tw~en two breath te§t resµlts (SOP 
6.2} clip n.ot oq:ur with the Intoxilyzer sooo EN. Through my BTS training 1 my 
tmderst~riolng Js,thi3tthe Intoxilyzer 5000 EN is programmed to inform the operator 
wh!::n to hqve the driver blow. Therefore ls SOP 6.2 for the Alco Sensor III and Ufelot 
FC20 and not the Ihtoxilyzer 5000 EN? 
Also I h;;we reviewed the Intoxilyzer 5000 manual. On pag~ 27 number 12 you have 
SOP Iit as a reference. I believe this SOP is from an old reference section number. 
As a hearing officer, I really respect the time your ag~ncy has taken to update this 
manual and the SbPs. I hope these updates reinforce our ALS decisions. 
Eric G. Moody 
ALS Hearing Officer 
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